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Practices and meanings of non-professional 
stock trading in Taiwan: a case of relational 
work 
Abstract 
 
Non-professional investors, especially outside the Anglo Saxon context, represent an 
important and under-researched topic for sociological studies of finance. The paper presents a 
qualitative study of non-professional investors in Taiwan, where levels of participation in the 
stock market are very high. It shows that investors are embedded in complex networks of 
social relations, cultural norms and economic projects. We use Zelizer’s notions of ‘relational 
work’ and ‘earmarking’ to explore how economic relations construct and reinforce social 
relations: investing is productive of, as well as derived from, social structures. Stock market 
participation secures access to social groupings and reproduces hierarchical relations in 
families and social networks. Our study seeks to highlight the relational content of financial 
markets, and calls for further investigation of the relational work performed by the material- 
calculative architectures of high finance.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper presents an account of non-professional stock market participation in Taiwan. The 
study of non-professional financial actors is vital to our understanding of the spread of 
financial market practice, and the related issues of economic participation and ‘shareholder 
democracy’ (Aitken, 2003). Our focus, however, is slightly different. We offer a study of 
Taiwanese non-professional investors as a counterfactual to the professional, Western – 
sometimes material – financial actors that predominate in the sociological studies of finance. 
Our analysis suggests that attention be directed not only to the role of social and cultural 
relations in formatting economic action (Chan, 2009; DiMaggio, 1994;  in the context of the 
financial crisis Engelen et al., 2012; Granovetter, 1985), but also to the social and cultural 
relations constituted by economic action itself. Through an exploration of non-professional 
investors in a distinct cultural context we pose an empirical challenge to idealized notions of 
social relation immanent in the ‘purified’ economic relations of high capitalism (Slater, 2002; 
Slater and Tonkiss, 2001), and continue a much needed project of politicising the STS-
inspired ‘new, new economic’ sociology.  
 
Investing is hugely popular in the Taiwan and there are eighty-seven brokerage accounts per 
hundred of population, although it is worth noting that only a small minority can expect to 
earn reliable profits from trading (Barber, Lee, Liu, & Odean, 2007; Barber, Yi-Tsung Lee, 
Liu, & Odean, 2014). Investing is a phenomenon that has developed alongside the 
liberalisation of the Taiwan stock exchange from the 1980s onwards. It exists in an 
idiosyncratic financial culture that marries the industrialised free market with traditional 
financial structures and social relations (Besley and Levenson, 1996; Chan, 2009).  The 
investors studied are embedded in complex networks of social and economic relations, and 
have multiple motivations – social and economic, pragmatic and aspirational – for engaging 
in the stock market. Moreover, investment activity and the transactions that surround it have a 
relational character, constructing and performing social relations, demarcating status and 
reproducing social capital and status. Our study therefore contributes to the growing 
recognition that mundane social relations must be written into the sociology of economic 
activity (Moor and Lury, 2011) and suggests that a focus on locally produced, specific 
economic arrangements (Miller, 2002) might challenge empirical researchers to explore how 
the more formal modes of calculation documented in much European economic sociology 
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(Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; Callon and Muniesa, 2005) naturalize and perform a specific 
kind of arms-length economic relation.  
 
The claim that social relations determine the shape of economic action is by now a taken-for-
granted of economic sociology. Since the 1970s the ‘new’ economic sociology (NES) has 
offered a variety of structural explanations for economic activity based on networks and 
social relationships, all loosely governed by the term ‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1973; 
Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). The embeddedness approach – the 
understanding that economic activity is driven by the flow of information through social ties, 
and can be mathematically modelled as such – has achieved phenomenal success: 
Granovetter’s original 1973 paper has been cited some 35,000 times and his theory ‘enjoys a 
privileged… position as the organizing principle of economic sociology’ (Krippner, 2001). 
Subsequently, the role of culture in shaping network relations has been recognised by an 
extensive literature on ‘cultural embeddedness’ (see, e.g. Biggart and Beamish, 2003; Biggart 
and Guillen, 1999; DiMaggio, 1994). Culture, like social ties more generally, tends to be 
regarded as an explanation external to agents’ calculative activities. Chan (2009) seeks to 
rectify this position, via an ethnography of life insurance sales in China showing how culture 
can be ‘manifests both as cultural rules that define common prescribed, and organise 
interactions… and as repertoires that provide symbols and practical skills for individual 
actors’ (Chan, 2009, p. 744).  
 
Our understanding of social ties and their mechanisms has been stretched by the ‘new, new’ 
(McFall and Ossandon, 2014) economic sociology – to which this paper contributes. It shown 
that economic actors are embedded in networks comprising technical devices and economic 
theory – whether mainstream or heterodox – as well as social ties. In fact, such scholarship 
seeks to contest the hegemony of ‘the social’ (Latour, 2007) in explaining economic action. 
Socio-material networks share calculation and make economic action a possibility through 
processes of framing and purification (Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 
2007), where the rational, calculative economic agent is the result of complex sociological 
configuration (e.g. in the context of financial markets, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007). The 
anthropological perspective brings us to a similar pass. For example, Slater (2002) offers a 
theoretical insight chiming with that of Chan: market exchange is characterised by 
transactions where actors’ ‘entanglements become the objects of instrumental 
rationality’(Slater, 2002, p. 52). In both Slater and Chan’s analyses, the purpose of such 
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entanglements is ultimately instrumental and they are alienated and settled through an 
eventual sale. For Callon, Slater and others, the distinguishing feature of market exchange is 
the eventual attainment of ‘quits’. Crucially, in each explanation, cultural, theoretical or 
material resources are invoked in purging the economic of its social content, once the social 
has given the economic its distinctive form: the traffic from social to economic is one way.   
 
Callon’s account of purification and disembeddeness is convincing in a financial world 
comprising increasingly material forms of calculation. We suggest, however, that such 
material calculation is predicated upon and reproduces a particular conception of arm’s-
length social relations predicated on Western conceptions – and legal articulations – of such 
things as property (Ailon, 2015). The challenge for research, therefore, is not only to describe 
diversity in forms of calculation and the different ‘cultural’ devices which produce such 
variety of action (Entwistle and Slater, 2014; Slater, 2002), but also to recognize that social 
relations may themselves be constituted by economic relations, and that culture is locally 
produced and embedded in specific institutional arrangements, devices and language. An 
analysis of the mutually generative forms of economic and social relations in a specific 
setting – here private investing within a niche group in Taiwan – may help sensitise us to 
those processes at work elsewhere, on Wall Street, or even in the political economy of high-
frequency trading algorithms (see here, for example, MacKenzie, 2017). 
 
In this paper we pick out such a path, using Zelizer’s (1994, 2005, 2012) conceptualization of 
social relations and economic action in order to understand the recursive and mutually 
generative relationship between economic agency and cultural practices. Zelizer is best 
known for her sociological theory of money (Zelizer, 1994) which has provoked much debate 
in Economy and Society and elsewhere (Ingham, 2001).  Yet she also focuses on the social 
content of economic relations more generally, and on the ‘creative effort people make 
establishing, maintaining, negotiating, transforming, and terminating interpersonal relations’ 
through economic activity (Zelizer, 2012, p. 149). She argues that the processes of 
categorisation, or ‘earmarking’, undertaken during economic activity are themselves 
constitutive of particular social relations, which soon become institutionalized as cultural 
forms. So, for example, US farming families in the early 20th century made a distinction 
between a husband’s wheat and corn money, and a wife’s egg and butter money (pin money), 
distinctions that have persisted into the contemporary labour market (Zelizer, 1994). Zelizer 
notes, citing Zaloom’s (2006) study of professional traders, that stock-trading (like casino 
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gambling) is only possible when the ‘persistent personal markers’ (Zelizer, 2012, p. 157) of 
money have been removed. Developing Zelizer’s position, Lainer-Vos (2013) suggests that 
actors use clarification practices to separate gift and market exchange, categories that often 
overlap. In some instances, however, they use blurring practices to avoid these kind of 
distinctions, creating a zone of indeterminacy, ‘an institutional context within which actors 
can engage each other without sharing a consensus regarding the meaning of the object that 
changes hands and the rights and obligations that follow from the exchange’(Lainer-Vos, 
2013, p. 146). The capacity of economic relations to generate high-level social structures is, 
of course, the founding insight of critical sociology, but our interest remains (following 
Latour 2007) at the micro level. The recognition that social mores and habits are determinants 
of micro-level economic activity and vice versa (Steiner, 2012) may, therefore, have much to 
offer a sociological analysis of non-professional investment, and financial market activity 
more generally.  
 
Non-professional investing in the West and Taiwan 
 
A growing sociological literature has investigated non-professional investors, particularly in 
the Anglo-Saxon context. It contrasts to the individualistic perspective of behavioural 
economics (Barber and Odean, 2000), which offers explanations of investor activity focused 
on, for example, overconfidence and the unwillingness to realize losses (Odean, 1998), 
mental accounting and the failure of investors to learn from their poor performance (Barberis 
and Huang, 2001). Harrington’s qualitative study of investment clubs in the USA sees non-
professional investors as embedded in webs of social relations, tradition, established ways of 
doing and social identity. She understands these clubs in terms of narratives, noting that 
‘when individuals buy a stock…they are also buying a story. And in buying the story of the 
company, they are buying a story about themselves’ (Harrington, 2008, p. 48). The values of 
consumer culture permeate these clubs, and investment decisions are taken not only for 
economic reasons but also on the basis of brand esteem, consumer prejudice, group solidarity 
or simply for the sake of doing something over nothing. Harrington locates the boom in 
investment clubs in a broader picture of declining financial security and absence of collective 
retirement plans and a new vision of American democracy. Similarly, Roscoe (2015) sees 
investors in the UK as caught up in neo-liberal notions of self-entrepreneurship and financial 
responsibility constructed by investment service firms as docile and productive consumers.  
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Other studies of non-professional investors have shown an isolated and lonely occupation. 
Preda (2009) records the face-to-screen ‘brief encounters’ of individual non-professional 
investors as they chat through their trades against the invisible others, just as traders watched 
by Zaloom (2006) took on an imaginary market villain named the ‘spoofer’. Roscoe (2013) 
examines the virtual ‘embeddedness’ of non-professional investors, and shows that online 
interactions and relationships are often more important to individuals than the spectacle of 
real-world investment performances. Studies of the calculative practices of nonprofessional 
investors, for example the ‘chartists’ examined by Mayall (2007, 2008) and Roscoe and 
Howorth (2009) also show idiosyncratic modes of investment entangled with material 
devices rather than embedded in networks of social relations. Investors find themselves 
united by shared discursive resources in terms of understanding the market (Ailon, 2015) and 
by a common hostility to established, professional finance (Hansen, 2015). 
 
While the discourses and practices of the Anglo-Saxon investing world display a remarkable 
homogeneity, even across different continents, the Taiwanese context is distinctive. The 
1980s and 1990s were periods of rapid economic expansion and social change in Taiwan. 
Free-market reform and industrialization of an agrarian economy led to an idiosyncratic mix 
of industrialized consumption patterns and traditional economic structures (Besley and 
Levenson, 1996). Indeed, Besley and Levenson (1996, p. 40) could report ‘a widespread view 
that Taiwan has achieved remarkable economic growth despite an underdeveloped formal 
financial sector.’ GDP per capita grew from US$ 2,389 in 1980 to US$ 14,941 in 2000 
(National Statistics, Taiwan), while policies of liberalization, privatization, deregulation and 
internationalization encouraged the rapid growth of securities industry and individual 
brokerage accounts increased from 362,271 to 12,359,893 (Taiwan Stock Exchange).  
 
In the Chinese literature, Kao and Wu (2002) attribute the rapid growth in the number of 
sanhu (non-professional investors) in Taiwan’s stock market during the period to the 
simultaneous transformation of Taiwanese economic and demographic structures. They 
classify Taiwanese sanhu into six categories: in the financial industry, in listed companies, 
guyoushe sanhu (a now unpopular form of association involving closed, subscription-based 
information networks), in brokerage offices, quasi-family investing and relationships based 
on screen (online sanhu, resembling their counterparts in the UK and Australia). Our study 
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concerns the latter two categories. Wu (2005) examines the hierarchical structure of the 
Taiwan stock market’s informational dissemination. He argues that sanhu occupy the lowest 
level of the structure, distant from information sauces and lacking capability to interpret 
information. As a consequence, sanhu usually are the inferior players in the market, 
compared to professional practitioners (such as fund managers), or dahu. Wu’s findings are 
paralleled by the English-language literature on Taiwan. During in the bull market of the 
mid-2000s the Taiwan Stock Exchange was one of the leading ‘emerging markets’; in 2006 it 
could be ranked fifteenth in the world by trading volumes (Chang, Hsieh, & Lai, 2009). Yet it 
remained small enough for prices to be moved by inflows of foreign capital, presenting 
opportunities for informed traders. Foreign institutional investors benefited most from such 
movements while domestic individual investors tended to lose out (Barber, et al., 2007). 
 
Taiwanese investing practices take place within a distinct cultural context. Chinese economic 
relations are distinguished by a reliance on guanxi, a culturally specific form of social 
relation, a novel feudal phenomenon that developed following the cultural Revolution (Hertz, 
1998, p. 108). Chan  (2009, pp. 722-724) provides a detailed review of the role of guanxi in 
Chinese business. These social ties, which Chan finds operating most effectively among 
social relationships of medium strength, have survived economic reforms on account of the 
significant meanings bound up in them. Developing a framework of tie-strength around the 
notion of Chinese social relations as patterned in a ‘differential mode of association’, Chan 
distinguishes between ascribed (kinship) relations, acquired relations based on shared 
experience, and business relations caused exclusively for commercial purposes. Importantly, 
‘close ties in Chinese societies operate according to the principle of need, whereas the 
principle of equity applies only to distant and impersonal ties’. In other words, Chinese social 
relations are distinguished by principle of asymmetric obligation operating within stronger 
ties and a necessarily strong symbolic dimension associated with interactions within these 
ties. Among weaker ties, Chan observed would-be vendors dramatising family style 
relationships, such as a daughter-in-law, or a naive sister, generating ‘fictive kin ties’ (Chan, 
2009, p. 739) in order to facilitate sales. Hertz (1998, p. 111) links guanxi with the expression 
and negotiation of face (mianzi): ‘the ability to obtain or grant desirables through one social 
network is a measure of one's social status, and hence one’s face.’ Hertz’s (1998) 
ethnography of the nearby Shanghai stock exchange suggests that non-professional investors 
represented an important constituency of the market and describes how they cluster together, 
forming social groups or taking part in associations to exchange market information; they 
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crowd into brokerage offices to trade stock and prefer political  to fundamental and technical 
analysis. A decade later, Ko-Kang Chien (2008) explores the developments of financial 
media and production of investment knowledge in Taiwan’s stock market. He suggests that 
non-professional investors’ understanding of the market is framed by the media. Taiwanese 
investing is, like the whole economy, in flux. Our own data show brokerage offices to be in 
decline, visited by shrinking numbers of older investors.  In the context of the Taiwanese 
stock-market, research has also shown that participation in the stock market increases 
alongside household wealth and education and that stock-market participation is determined 
by family wealth, education level and financial literacy (Hsiao, Chen, & Liao, 2014; Lee, 
2012). 
 
Our account of Taiwanese investors clearly identifies the role of specific, culturally 
embedded relationships in structuring transactions. It shows carefully maintained personal 
boundaries, and individual, even secretive action. Calculative aids such as news channels, 
stock tips, charts and websites are certainly present in the interview accounts, but investors’ 
transactions are embedded in the minutiae of cultural exchange: family ties and customs, and 
information passed through social exchanges. We also show how economic relations give rise 
to and reproduce social structures. Our analysis shows a complex of practices where, in the 
words of Wherry (2014, p. 422), ‘the intertwining of markets and social life results in 
fundamentally transformed contractual exchanges’.  
 
Methodology 
 
Existing qualitative research on non-professional investors has accessed individuals through 
intermediary organizations or engaged with them at events such as exhibitions. Neither 
method was suitable for Taiwan: there is no equivalent membership organisation for 
investors, nor are there any investment shows, and there are legal restrictions on the sharing 
of contact information. The first author, a native speaker, sought volunteers for interviews via 
social connections and then, in to order access a wider range of interviewees, by snowball-
sampling method. As a result our sample may not be generalizable to the entire population of 
lay investors in Taiwan’s stock market, especially as investing is such a universally popular 
activity in Taiwan; we present a detailed account of one segment of the investing population 
– well educated, affluent (with portfolios ranging from $1000, these smaller amounts donated 
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by parents, to $400,000) and white collar. Our label of ‘affluent’ is partly emergent from the 
data: interviewees considered the ability to participate in Taiwan’s highly inflated property 
market as the definition of ‘wealth’, and many saw investing as a pathway to that wealth.   
 
A total of 38 interviews were conducted, of which twenty-nine respondents were Taiwanese 
non-professional investors, and nine were professionals in Taiwan’s stock market. The first 
author conducted the interviews in Taiwan. Thirty-seven interviews were conducted in person 
and the exception was conducted by Windows Live Messenger. All interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. Interviews lasted between 20 minutes to two hours. Table I gives details of 
interviewees. Interviews were conducted in neutral locations. The investing and surrounding 
activities discussed in the interviews took place in the home, in classrooms, in scattered 
locations and on an ongoing, irregular timescale. Interviews were therefore an appropriate 
means of allowing participants to discuss and present their own detailed accounts and 
understandings of their investing practices and meanings (Easterby-Smith, 2002). While the 
snowballing method does have limitations in terms of sample and representativeness, it does 
offer considerable advantages in the Taiwanese cultural context. Topics raised during 
interviews (such as personal saving, investment gains and losses) are usually thought 
‘sensitive’ questions and are unlikely to be answered if posed by a stranger. Considerable 
trust is required if interviewees are prepared to discuss matters implying potential loss of 
face. The word of mouth method made use of existing social connections. It is unlikely that 
interviewees would have talked openly to complete strangers, but social connections gave 
rise to more honest and open answers. Pseudonyms have been used throughout to preserve 
anonymity.  
 
Data were analysed thematically (Miles and Huberman, 1994) by hand and grouped around 
emerging themes and themes identified from the literature. Interview material presented in 
this paper relates to the 29 interviews with non-professional investors. Observational data 
were also collected in four brokerage offices in Taiwan (three in Taipei and one in Tainan). 
Although these data are of less relevance to the present paper they were used for triangulation 
(Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1965). The interview data from professional 
practitioners (not listed in table I), were also used as a resource for triangulation: the first 
author was able to discuss the trading practices and habits of non-professional investors with 
the brokers and to observe the investors trading and socialising in the office. Social relations 
within the office could be observed in practice and closely mirrored the status-reinforcing 
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trading practices described in interviews. For example, one highly profitable trader known as 
‘Shifu’ (Master) spurned the offer of a VIP room to sit in the brokerage lobby, speaking 
loudly, his trades imitated by lesser-status investors. Chatter within the brokerage room 
reflected that beyond it: a mixture of investing news and gossip and family life entwined in 
the conversations. The voices of professionals are backgrounded in this paper because of their 
distinct occupational context, apparently little different to that of their Western counterparts 
as described, for example, by Hardie and MacKenzie (2007). A detailed study of Taiwanese 
professional finance falls beyond the remit of this paper. 
 
 
Non-professional investing in Taiwan 
 
The following sections present our empirical study. We examine investing as a practice 
through which household and family relations are ordered, and capitals (Bourdieu, 1984) 
accessed and reproduced. We follow Slater (2002) in distinguishing between calculation and 
transaction; while the investors are embedded in material calculative agencements comprising 
stock charts, for example, we show that moments of transaction give rise to distinctive social 
relations. These relations hybridise the relatively new phenomenon of stock investing with 
existing patterns of gift and exchange embedded in family and friendship relationships. Our 
empirical question concerns itself as much with the social relations generated by economic 
activity, as economic activity driven by social relations: the final section of the article shows 
investing as constitutive of exclusive social relations which confer substantial advantages 
upon those within the networks.  
 
Investing, a family affair 
 
Our data show that much investing activities located in household and family. Investing 
offers a means for the intergenerational transmission (and translation) of status and capitals 
(Bourdieu, 1984) within families, who provide economic and intellectual capital for their 
children to learn trading, seen as a source of social capital. The economic capital comes in the 
shape of cash and unused brokerage accounts, while intellectual capital is transmitted through 
discussion, help and ‘moral support’. Earmarking sums of money for training makes losses 
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acceptable, not by removing personal markers (c.f. Zelizer, 2012), but by marking the money 
specifically for the purpose of loss.  
 
Interviews show how trading forms the basis for conversations between parents and siblings, 
both as a family entertainment and a parental lesson. Stock trading is seen as an essential skill 
of economic life, part of the education that must be passed to children, and a productive 
pastime that crosses gender and generation in the household. For example, Ms Wu (F, 20s, 
student) began stock trading when she first earned money from a part-time job. ‘My parents 
gave me moral support,’ she says. ‘They set an example… Their friends are trading stock as 
well’. Ms Wu summed up her received ideas on the economic and social importance of 
trading when she remarked: ‘no matter early or late, stock trading is necessary to learn in 
everyone’s life...to do ‘investment’, you have to learn trading first.’ As with Harrington’s 
(2008) analysis of American investment clubs, the popularity of non-professional investment 
reflects broader social changes and understandings of economic participation in an 
increasingly market-driven Taiwan. 
 
Eleven of the twelve interviewees who are under 35 years old have ‘investor parents’. Cong-
Ying (M, 20s, student) began trading in college. He describes – using a vocabulary of play 
and experiment – the influence of his family: 
It happened naturally, because my family are ‘playing’. Father and mother are 
‘playing’. Besides, my junior brother is studying finance in his postgraduate degree. It 
became that three people at home are ‘touching’ stock. It would be weird … if I had 
not ‘touched’ it. Being influenced gradually, I decided to ‘play’ stock with them. 
For many, the first glimpse of trading comes from observing parents. During his junior and 
high school period, Mr Liu (M, 20s, student) watched his father browsing the stock-trading 
websites, and often discussed trading with his father. ‘It looked very interesting,’ Mr Liu 
says, ‘so I got involved in it.’ He joined internet forums about stock trading, bought stock-
investing magazines, and watched stock analysis programmes on television. ‘Through these 
channels, I partially understood some probably right or wrong theories about stock trading,’ 
he says. Mr Liu is enmeshed here in calculative apparatus familiar to non-professional 
investors worldwide. His investing, however, is accompanied by transactions that merge 
family relations and economic exchange through a deliberate indeterminacy of language: 
when he entered college, his father accompanied him to a brokerage office to open an account 
into which he deposited NT$50,000 (£1,000). Mr Liu’s father told him that the money was 
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lent to him solely for trading stock. After a period of time, Mr Liu felt the money was not 
enough and asked his father to ‘lend’ him another $50,000. Mr Liu remarked that it seemed 
very ‘natural’ to ask his father to provide him the trading capital after many years of talking 
about trading. Here, a small sum of money is earmarked as trading capital, at risk of loss. In 
the first instance Mr Liu’s father gifts money with certain obligations and moral 
requirements, and Mr Liu, having delivered on those obligations can naturally ask for a 
further ‘loan’. The description of the money as a loan helps to blur the distinction between 
gift and business transaction, creating ‘a zone of indeterminacy’ (Lainer-Vos, 2013) where 
father and son can manage the conflicting responsibility and obligations incurred by the 
transaction. Mr Liu is neither bound by gift-based reciprocal obligations nor a strict 
contractual exchange; he is, however, able to employ the discourse of economic exchange to 
ask for further funds for his investing. 
 
Yi-Hong (M, 20s, student) is another investor who has been introduced to trading by his 
family. His mother is a stay-at-home investor who watches real-time stock market 
information on television at home every weekday. His father and grandfather are investors. 
He remembers stock charts piled always on the top of his grandfather’s desk when he was a 
child; his grandfather had been a big player at that time, but lost almost all his money in a 
crash. After that, his grandfather has rarely touched stock. At the end of his first year of 
college, Yi-Hong wanted to start trading. However, he did not have any capital and hesitated 
to tell his parents about his intentions, perhaps on account of his grandfather’s huge loss. For 
three months he practiced trading on paper, sharpening his ‘sense’ of the market. Only then 
did he casually ask, ‘Do you think it’s a good time to do some stock trading?’ His parents’ 
attitudes were unexpectedly positive. Yi-Hong’s parents gave him a dormant brokerage 
account belonging to his father; the account still had around NT$30,000 (around US$1,000), 
which Yi-Hong used as his original capital for stock trading. Again, an investor armed with 
material calculative apparatus in the form of a trading game (c.f. Roscoe, 2015) enters into 
transactions through which family-based relational work takes place.  In a similar way, Zhi-
Chun (F, 30s, employed) started to trade stock when she began to work as a cabin crew 
member. Her mother suggested that Zhi-Chun take up stock trading, so that her down-time 
should not be wasted: stock trading would be a productive use of her leisure. Zhi-Chun’s 
mother and her husband gave their daughter NT$100,000 (around £2,000) as the starting 
capital, giving her not only a moral imperative but also economic support.   
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The introduction of these second or third generation investors to trading contrasts with that of 
older investors who were introduced to the market by friends and at brokerage houses; as 
recently as the mid-1990s, brokerage houses remained central to non-professional investing 
(Hertz, 1998). Mrs Kuo (F, 60s, home-maker) first visited a brokerage office, many of which 
were located on Huai-Ming Street, near Taipei railway station, in 1974. She still visits her 
brokerage, as does Sheng-Ji (M, 60s, retired) who goes daily and has a seat in the VIP area. 
Shu-Ling (F, 40s, out of work/homemaker) and her mother learned how to trade in the 
brokerage office but no longer go there. Mrs Zeng (F, 60s, retired) recalls how her neighbour 
introduced her to the stock market and taught her the basic idea of charting, recording daily 
closing prices: 
She asked me to draw the lines. She said, ‘You studied in high school and I only 
graduated from elementary school. You have to draw it.’ At that time, temperature-
recording sheets with small grids were often available in hospitals. I took 
temperature-recording sheets to record share prices … Actually, I did not understand 
much. I only drew one type of chart. Drawing, drawing, drawing. When the prices 
reached a very high point, I would sell it quickly. That was all. 
Here hierarchical relations between market actors are maintained. Mrs Zheng, persuaded by 
her friend participates in the market, is now signed a position of pupil, the dependent lower 
status act. This reinforces the asymmetric obligation that characterises guanxi and forms a 
channel for the enhancement of the neighbour’s face.  
 
Interview data show that younger investors now receive information, share tips and skills 
through social media and online messenger services. While conducting observations of 
brokerages, the first author often felt conspicuous on account of his relative youth; investors 
peered at him and on two occasions questioned his presence directly. As investing in Taiwan 
has become normalized it has moved from the public to the private sphere, and the shared 
space of the brokerage is declining, as Mrs Kuo describes: 
Twenty years ago all the brokerage houses were full. Many had to stand…some 
people, because there were not enough chairs there, brought their own chairs…In the 
past there were many people in our place, crowded with people. Now all are gone.  
The older generation remain sceptical of new investing methods. Mr. Yang’s son relied on 
the Internet to trade stock, but Mr. Yang told the first author: ‘just because he knows how to 
use the Internet doesn’t mean he would make money.’ However, both the young and old 
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generations value market information from their social ties: 25 of 29 interviewees consider 
personal relations as one of main means to access information. 
 
Family politics and secret savings 
 
Our study shows relational work among investors as strategies of earmarking, blurring, and 
clarification are used not only to strengthen relationships and deliver parental guidance but 
also to avoid conflict. Participants in these exchanges emphasise the familial basis of their 
relationship and seek economic arrangements that support and strengthen those relationships. 
Investing becomes entangled with other aspects of family politics. This is exemplified by the 
case of Ou-Yang (F, 30s, employed), whose mother deposited money in Ou-Yang’s bank 
account, and asked her daughter to use this money as capital invest on her behalf. Her mother 
also implied that, although she provided capital and took the risk of capital loss, any profit 
could be freely used by her daughter. Ou-Yang had never studied business and finance, and 
her job was not connected to commerce, but she is the member of the family closest to her 
mother; this was a covert action of gifting money, obscured by the mother’s claim that Ou-
Yang was only helping to manage her wealth. This blurring strategy avoided the jealousy of 
Ou-Yang’s sister and any potential tension between the sisters. It provides a zone of 
indeterminacy around which family relations and economic relations can be worked out; the 
mother’s economic preference towards her favourite daughter can be perceived in multiple 
ways. At the same time, Ou-Yang’s mother clarifies the covert gift as a commercial 
arrangement to avoid sibling jealousy. It is likely that the sister recognized the strategy – 
which is presented in the interviews as such – and was also complicit in it as a means of 
maintaining family relationships. 
 
In another, more complex, instance of entangling and blurring, Mr Zhan (M, 30s, employed) 
also opened a brokerage account for his mother in his own name. The motivation is very 
different from the gift and support seen in Ou-Yang’s case, instead reinforcing maternal 
authority. Her brother (Zhan’s uncle) had advised the family to buy shares in a company with 
which he was connected: ‘The money was provided by a parent,’ says Mr Zhan, ‘the parent 
bought stock through the account registered in Zhan’s name.’ For Mr Zhan’s mother and the 
other relatives, it seemed an assured opportunity to make a profit (it is possible that this was 
insider information – the interviewee does not explain the reason explicitly): ‘So, everybody 
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bought the stock.’ The mother, a senior official, did not already have her own stock account 
and at the time and was ‘too busy’ to handle the ‘triviality’ of this trading. Mr Zhan ‘had to’ 
be his mother’s ‘agent’, and trade the stock in his own name. After his mother took back the 
capital and profit, Mr Zhan kept the account open and started his own stock trading. In this 
case, a zone of indeterminacy serves to separate Mr Zahn’s mother from her ownership of the 
stock, allowing him to take responsibility (and accountability) for the trade; earmarking funds 
nominally belonging to Mr Zahn allows his mother to benefit from any upside. Once again it 
is useful to distinguish between calculation and transaction. While calculation is simply a 
product of social relations and information, the complex transaction has a more relational 
character, reproducing and reinforcing the existing power structures of the family, forcing the 
junior member to shoulder administrative burden as well as some risk, while allowing the 
mother to benefit from any gains. The relational work here and that discussed in the previous 
section both serve to reproduce status relationships within the family.  
 
There remains secrecy regarding personal savings. In Taiwan, personal savings which are 
unknown to other family members are called ‘sifangqian’. Traditionally, a Taiwanese family 
operated as a single economic unit, and each person’s savings were considered to be part of 
the family’s wealth to be used for the family’s benefit. Many people, therefore, held secret 
savings of which other family members were unaware. In the past, especially, the husband 
controlled the family’s economic resources and budget, so the wife would have sifangqian for 
herself. Nowadays, sifangqian remains in some form in many Taiwanese families, and both 
husbands and wives may have sifangqian. For some investors, money for trading stock is a 
part of their sifangqian, and so rarely discussed. Ms. Qiu’s (F, 20s, employed) family is an 
example. All her family members know the others are trading stock, but they do not discuss 
this issue at home: 
My father plays a lot in the stock market … Indeed, he has never told us when every 
time he plays … He has not discussed these kind of questions with me. Probably, he 
does not want me or my mother to know the cash flow of his money … Our family 
members seldom ask each other about the situation of each other’s stock trading… It 
seems that each family member does not want another family member to know the 
detail of their sifangqian. 
Here, economic relations are arranged to allow individuals a measure of autonomy that would 
not otherwise be possible in a collective economic unit. Similarly, Ms Wu’s (F, 20s, student) 
parents, despite providing economic capital and moral support, no longer discuss stock 
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trading at home – apparently unwilling to reveal any details of their own stock market 
activities.  
 
In summary, despite the willingness to pass on economic capital and social capital (Bourdieu, 
1984) in the form of encouragement, strict boundaries remain, and family structures of 
various kinds are reproduced by individual economic arrangements. Stock trading becomes 
part of the relational work (Zelizer, 2012) of the household: reproducing relations of power, 
showing favouritism, and maintaining privacy. In some instances, profits are earmarked as 
belonging to either the owner of the capital or the trader. The separation of trading accounts 
as sifangqian, however, lessens the need to earmark trading monies as belonging to an 
individual.  
 
Investing and status 
 
Anglo-Saxon investors invoke certain stories as reasons for becoming involved in the market. 
These stories are often hostile to institutional finance and promote an entrepreneurial 
discourse of economic self-reliance (Harrington, 2008; Roscoe, 2015). In Taiwan, investing 
is seen as a means for those unable to afford a property in Taiwan’s inflated property market 
to raise capital to purchase a house, to increase income or to prepare for retirement. A 
definition of wealth as demarcated by property ownership emerges from the interviews.  
Property investment is considered a means for the rich to increase their wealth and to 
maintain their status, impossible for those without capital. Mr Yan (M, 30s, employed) claims 
that ‘success’ in a person’s life is determined by their property holdings. His goal is to engage 
in property investment and stock trading is regarded as an ‘interim business’: ‘Before I enter 
the property market,’ he says, ‘stock trading is an instrument to extend my capital.’ Mr Yan 
suggests that such ambitions underlie the popularity of trading in Taiwan: he believes the 
average income of Taiwanese ‘salarymen’ (white-collar workers) is too low and many of 
them are looking for an alternative way to accumulate wealth. Again, there are clear parallels 
between Taiwanese narratives and those of American investors, who stress the necessity of 
investing in the absence of alternatives: ‘Where else are we going to put our money? In the 
mattress?’ (Harrington, 2008:149). 
 
18 
 
Earmarking of monies as capital-at-risk is supported by a tendency to regard losses as an 
inevitable part of learning to invest. Interviewees suggested that that ‘experience comes from 
bad decisions’ and considered the losses as the fees investors must pay the market during the 
learning process: Mrs. Kuo, for example, uses the phrase ‘to buy experience’ when talking 
about her losses. Moreover, as Harrington notes, profit and loss are themselves socially 
constructed to a surprising degree; we suggest that losses may be considered as expenditure 
(i.e. not losses) if they are accounted for a particular way, whether passing social and 
intellectual capital to children or maintaining status and market position relative to other 
actors (Fligstein, 2001).  
 
Many nonprofessional investors were attracted to the practice by success stories told to them 
by family and friends. As the stock market expanded rapidly in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, so stories of individuals amassing enormous wealth abounded. While such fairy-tales 
lacked the credibility needed to inspire potential traders (Wu 2005), interviewees explained 
that the visible success of relations, neighbours and friends encouraged them to begin trading. 
Introductions via friends were particularly important for older investors who lacked investor 
parents or financial mass media. For example, Mrs Kuo’s brother had been led into trading by 
the story of a successful uncle. Mrs Kuo (F, 60s, homemaker) recalls that he planned to 
imitate one of their uncles, who had earned a lot of money by trading stock, and had made 
enough money to buy a property in central Taipei, an unusual but impressive story that took 
place before the stock market explosion of the 1980s. Ms Zeng (F, 60s, retired), a retired civil 
servant, began stock trading 26 years ago encouraged by a neighbour who portrayed herself 
as a successful example of the stock trader. One day, this neighbour said to her, ‘You are too 
poor, so you have to do stock trading.’ At that time, her neighbour had purchased two houses 
with money made on the stock market. ‘I told her that I don’t know how to buy stock,’ Ms 
Zeng says, ‘I didn’t know that it could make a profit.’ Following her neighbour’s suggestion, 
Ms Zeng mortgaged the house she already owned and used the money to trade stock. 
 
Once again, investing becomes the medium for relational work (Zelizer, 2012) as hierarchical 
relations – between family and friends, often exclusive and antagonistic – are reproduced 
through economic relations. Here the relational work takes the form of performances of 
expertise and success. As Chan (2009) shows, weaker-tie relationships provide actors with an 
opportunity for a fictitious, dramaturgical presentation, in this case of stock market success. 
In the case of Ms Zeng, a neighbour introduces the newcomer to the market and teaches her 
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the rudiments of trading, thereby enhancing her own dominant status and expertise; Mr Yang 
and the brother of Ms Kuo both take up the occupation to move through otherwise closed 
status boundaries, here exemplified by the purchase of investment property.  
 
In another example, stock trading served as a gateway to peer and status groups. Mr Yan (M, 
30s, employed) began stock trading when he was 22 years old, in the year he entered 
postgraduate education at a top research institute for electrical and communication 
engineering in Taiwan. Most of Mr Yan’s classmates and seniors had gained their 
undergraduate degree from this school. According to Mr Yan, his ‘pure-blood’ classmates, 
who had studied as both undergraduates and postgraduates in this school, thought themselves 
to be excellent in everything, including stock trading. They also had professional knowledge 
of IT and electrical manufacture, which could be used to analyse the IT and electrical 
industries’ market cycles. Trading stock was a part of the school culture. ‘All in the 
postgraduate school were investing’, Mr Yan says, ‘All in the postgraduate school and in my 
office were buying stock.’ Mr Yan was one of a few students who had graduated from less 
prestigious universities, and was initially excluded from the group. In this case, trading 
becomes a means for Mr Yan to gain entrance to a high-status group from which he was 
excluded. Trading profits translated into prestige and status. There are similarities with some 
of the all-male investment clubs studied by Harrington (2008) where professional expertise of 
certain industries and discourses of masculinity have great importance in trading discussions. 
In fact, Yan suffered early losses in his trading and was unable to admit them for worry of 
loss of face and exclusion; maintaining his position in the community required him to become 
a successful trader. 
 
Antagonistic social relations of investing 
 
Sociological perspectives on economic activity tend to emphasise the positive nature of 
networks in terms of information sharing, trust and reliability (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 
1996). Chan (2009) shows actors involved in a more instrumental use of social relations. Our 
study provides further examples of the potentially exclusive and antagonistic nature of social 
networks. Those outside of networks are greatly disadvantaged as family and friendship ties 
gave investors access to one particularly important kind of information: xiaoxi. The term, 
which literally translates as ‘information’, usually refers to the latest, or unpublished, 
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unreleased, or unconfirmed information (sometimes simply rumours) of listed companies’ 
operations, industries, markets, government policies and share-price-manipulation. Mr Yan 
gives an example of the circulation of xiaoxi in Taiwan’s stock market: 
‘In 07, I knew Shan-Zhu. While I was in graduate school, my trading had not been 
successful…Shan-Zhu said he would help me. At that time, his girlfriend and the 
people around him all said ‘his investment trading strategy is not an easy way to make 
money’, so they had reservations. However, in that time, the items which he 
recommended … He seemed to be able to freeze water by words. What he said would 
be that true. Immediately, my money increased from more than NT$ 5 million around 
£100,000 to more than NT$ 9 million £181,000. At best, it was over NT$ 11 
million…BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! Increased by one million in a month! Really 
incredible!’  
The relationship between Shan-Zhu captures elements of the guanxi described by Chan 
(2009): an asymmetric obligation based on friendship through which Mr Yan gains face as he 
is trading in successful. Another friendship-based relation with a clearly asymmetric 
obligation is described in the following example. In September 1988, Financial Minister Kuo, 
Wan-Rong announced that the government would restore capital gains tax for securities 
trading in the following year. After the announcement, share prices in Taiwan’s stock market 
fell continuously for 19 days and thousands of investors demonstrated against this new ruling. 
Hours before the announcement, however, Mrs Kuo received a call: 
A daka, an important person, told me, ‘run out and sell half of the shares first. 
Something’s already happened.’ I thought can any important incident happen?...I said 
‘ok, ok, ok,’ on the phone. I immediately went to sell shares at that time. 
 
Through the provision of inside information, economic status and capital can be enhanced, as 
in Mr Yan’s early and short-lived success, or preserved, as in Mrs Kuo’s case. At the same 
time social relations are reproduced – Mrs Kuo’s dependence on her ‘daka’ or Mr Yan’s on 
Shan-Zhu – through economic activity. Yet exclusion may not always be disadvantageous. 
Neixian is always uncertain. Even information from a long-term reliable informant can be 
wrong sometimes. For Mr Yan, whose story ended in heavy losses, one accurate neixian 
became seriously misleading. Both Mrs Kuo and Ms Zeng stated that some of their friends 
were ‘tripped up’ in the market due to inaccurate neixian. Other interviewees have heard a 
similar story, with the common theme that ‘the informant only calls the follower to hop on 
the bus, but the informant never reminds the follower when to hop off the bus.’  
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Discussion 
 
This paper has offered an account of the practices and meanings of investing among a group 
of Taiwanese non-professional investors. The role of both social relations and culture in 
structuring economic transactions has been thoroughly demonstrated in the literature of 
economic sociology. There has been a tendency, however, to regard such relationships as 
external and explanatory; Chan (2009) has sought to reinvigorate our understanding of social 
ties by showing how actors creatively shape and reproduce such ties in the pursuit of 
economic transactions. Our analysis explores how economic transactions, and calculation 
broadly understood, give rise to social relationships. We use Zelizer (2014) to argue that the 
activity of investing is constitutive of social relations: individuals use economic relations – in 
this case trading, money and related activities to organize, produce and maintain structures of 
friendship and family. Investing and the transactions that surround it (such as the gifting of 
capital for training purposes, or the visible demonstration of investment success for the 
purpose of maintaining social superiority) allow actors to reproduce patterns of social status 
and maintain access to social groups. Economic sociology has long recognised that market 
actors expend much effort on the preservation of status relative to others (Fligstein, 2001). 
Following Chan (2009) we see that asymmetric obligation underlies many of these 
relationships, and that transactions reproduce a distinctive form of social relation. Table 2 
classifies example transactions by the relational work involved: earmarking, blurring, 
controlling network access, controlling information flow, and performances of expertise and 
success. Kinship relations span family and friends only.   
 
Please see table ii below 
 
Zelizer argues that ‘earmarking’, classificatory strategies are central to building social 
relations. Our study shows these earmarking processes at work. First of all, stock-trading – 
and therefore money, time and activities associated with it – is earmarked as communal, 
collective and domestic, and therefore embedded in that sphere. It is quanmin yundong, a 
movement for all people (Mrs Hong). It is described as a game, and as playful. Parents 
earmark small, though not insignificant, sums of money in trading accounts, explicitly to help 
their children gain experience of trading in the markets. Earmarking identifies the money as 
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being losable, part of the costs of education, and classifies any winnings as a reward for hard 
study. Alternatively, sifangqian, or secret savings, are a means of earmarking money away 
from collective family arrangements. Earmarking processes are at work so that money raised 
from a mortgage or repurposed from savings for a deposit on a flat can be moved into the 
market despite the clear risks involved. Asymmetric obligations are present, and hierarchical 
relations between parents and children are maintained, while educational and cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1984; Fligstein, 2001) is consolidated within the younger generation.  
 
We also found individuals using ‘blurring’ strategies (Lainer-Vos, 2013) to negotiate 
transactions that are simultaneously economic exchange and gifts. Stock trading is embedded 
within the social relations of friendship and family but is at the same time an explicitly 
economic transaction. Relational work around trading depends upon blurring of certain 
categories. For a start, the language of investing does not make clear whether it is a business 
or a game: it is both trade, and gossip. Trading resists an entirely economic purification and 
framing (Callon, 1998) but entangles friendship and economic activity: consider A-Zhen (F, 
50s, self-employed) who takes her savings and begins to trade so that she can keep her 
friends company, although eventually all of the women suffer heavy losses. In instances 
where trading capital is gifted to children blurring strategies are essential in avoiding 
obligations inherent in both economic and gift exchange. Ou-Yang’s example – ‘looking 
after’ funds deposited by her mother in an account bearing Ou-Yang’s name – blurs the 
distinction between a gift and economic stewardship; in opening an account for his mother to 
trade on inside information Mr Zahn opens himself to loss or harm. Questions of equity and 
reciprocity associated with gift exchange or the alienation and obligation associated with 
economic transaction (Slater, 2002) present potential difficulties within families. Blurring the 
precise nature of transaction allows families to navigate these issues, although it is an artful 
settlement. Interview narratives suggested that willing complicity is required on all sides. 
 
The ‘new, new economic sociology’, following Callon (1998), suggests that economic 
activity becomes possible through a process of framing and disentangling, and directs 
attention to calculative agencements and the devices which support individual decision. 
Calculative devices of the kind detailed in existing work on nonprofessional investors feature 
in the background of these investors’ narratives. Yi-Hong remembers the charts piled up on 
his grandfather's desk, while Mr Liu joined trading forums and practiced his skills online.  
Calculation is tied up in the changing world of Chinese economic relations, caught between 
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traditional social relationships and contemporary electronic information channels: the latter, 
for example, are contested by the older generation who still prefer to visit brokerage houses. 
Guanxi remain imminent in the calculation of these investors. Local, specific projects and 
norms are seen to be an important part of the formatting of particular economic agencies: so, 
for example, investing patterns are shaped by local traditions of secret saving, a local 
tradition, while the notion that investing may in due course lead to property ownership is 
constituted by the specific situation of the Taiwanese mid-income families in an inflationary 
property market. 
 
It is well recognized that social relations shape economic activity, but our study shows a 
mutually constitutive pattern of constitution. In our account, transactions (Slater, 2002) 
performed specific social relationships. Trading activity is connected with economic status 
and access to privileged groups. Our study also shows, for example, how higher status actors 
work to preserve their position in the field relative to others. Trading knowledge may form a 
source of interpersonal authority, when one student assists another, or a neighbour persuades 
another to emulate her success in the marketplace. Neixian, unnamed and unreliable inside 
information, is implicated in the exploitation of non-professional investors in share corners 
and manipulations. In the case of Mrs Kuo’s timely avoidance of an infamous stock market 
crisis, the existence of well-placed friends confers substantial advantages over those less 
fortunate. Mr Yan became a trader to gain access to an elite group at his university; a Mr Yan 
is unwilling to admit losses because trading skill is perceived to be a marker of more general 
intellectual or personal ability. Mr Yan and Mrs Kuo both benefit from information flowing 
through network gatekeepers. In each case hierarchical relations between peers are 
reproduced and further dependencies are introduced. Performances of expertise and status 
form another way of maintaining hierarchical relations as successful individuals persuade 
their friends and neighbours to take up stock investing; once again, the new investor is 
obligated for  information and often this obligation is backed by risk in the form of debt taken 
on to fund investment.  
 
Callon’s account of the purification of economic transaction does leave the door ajar in terms 
of social relations and their contribution to economic agency. He offers an ‘anthropology of 
entanglement’ (Callon, 1998, p. 40), reading Zelizer to say ‘earmarking denotes all the 
practices through which agents particularise these inscriptions, by fixing trajectories, 
assigning movements, and simultaneously embedding money in a specific space of 
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circulation…she shows without difficulty that advanced societies proliferate earmarking and 
differentiation.’ (Callon, 1998, p. 35). It is this proliferation and earmarking that make 
calculation possible through the mobilisation of entities. It leads also to the overflowing and 
reframing that characterises economic life. In other words, money can only perform its 
function if it acquires temporary specificity and fixity through networks of relations, be they 
social or material. Those following Callon have shown how social relationships stabilise 
calculation among professional actors, in the trading room (Beunza and Stark, 2004), the 
hedge fund (Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007), the material political economy of algorithmic 
trading (MacKenzie, 2017), or the sale of bank products (Vargha, 2011), to offer but a few 
examples.  
 
We read Zelizer to argue that the traffic is reciprocal. Moments of transaction stabilise and 
reproduce social relationships: relations of status, esteem, or face. Of course, projected on a 
grander screen, this is the founding insight of critical sociology, and although our concern is 
less with structural regimes of domination and more with micro-level accounts of power, in 
in families, among friends, and within organisations, we make a small contribution towards 
the ongoing project of politicising market studies (Christophers, 2014; Giamporcaro and 
Gond, 2016). It is well recognised that social ties mediate trading relations among 
professionals, even machines: we encourage researchers to consider the counter-traffic. What 
do economic transactions do to social relations, in terms of producing dominance or 
constructing new networks, for example? Shrewd readers will have noticed that the warm 
sociality of our traders belies a personal alienation – mortgages defaulted, friendships 
strained, savings lost. What are the personal, even the moral consequences, of economic 
relations spilling into personal lives (Roscoe, 2014)?  
 
We suggest that Taiwanese non-professional investors provide a counterfactual to a 
preoccupation in sociological studies of financial markets with what happens ‘on Wall Street’ 
and to understandings of investment shaped by long-standing conceptions of equity 
participation and entrepreneurship (Harrington, 2008). While limited in empirical scope to 
one niche sector – non-professional investors, affluent, white-collar, Taiwanese –our study 
can serve to sensitise future research to the relational work inherent in financial trading 
elsewhere, and to de-naturalise conceptions of arm's-length relation embedded (and therefore 
performed by) in much financial market activity. Our contention is that all finance has a 
relational element. The relevance of our study to high finance therefore becomes an empirical 
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question to be answered in other contexts: what, for example, is the relational work of high-
speed trading, and what social relations does it reproduce? What is the moral and political 
economy of the trading algorithm  (MacKenzie, 2017)? What social relations are performed 
by the material structure of an exchange (Castelle, Millo, Beunza, & Lubin, 2016)?  
 
In conclusion, our study contributes to the growing recognition that mundane social relations 
must be written into the sociology of economic activity (Moor and Lury, 2011) and represent 
an important area of concern for the study of financial practice. We have considered stock-
trading from the perspective of a ‘relational sociology’ and have suggested that stock 
investing is constitutive of social relations, of ‘establishing, maintaining, negotiating, 
transforming, and terminating interpersonal relations’ (Zelizer, 2012, p. 149). While we 
accept the methodological limitations of our paper, we do propose that the high trust 
interview-based data gives phenomenological insight such questions, and we have attempted 
to elucidate the personal accounts of the practices and meanings of non-professional traders. 
By doing so, we hope to stimulate future empirical research on the relational consequences of 
financial market activity. Scholars such as Ourousoff (2010) and MacKenzie (2017) have 
shown how material calculation can become a battleground for rival performances of global 
finance. In the light of the importance and unpredictability of global stock markets, there is 
likely to be more than a little scope for further investigation: what is the relational work of 
Wall Street?   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Interviewees (non-professional investors only) 
 Gender Age Status Portfolio size (USD) 
Ms. Hong F 50s family business member 3k 
Ms. Lin F 50s family business member 3k 
Mr. Chen M 50s self-employed 33k-50k 
Zhi-Chun F 30s employed 3k 
Ou-Yang F 30s employed 3k 
Ms. Zeng F 60s retired 50k-100k 
Ms. Liu F 50s employed 16k 
Cong-Ying M 20s student 6k 
A-Liang M 50s self-employed 166k-2m 
A-Zhen F 50s self-employed 50k-150k 
Mr. Yang M 70s Retired/ brokerage office 
stayer 
66k-100k 
Shu-Ling F 40s out-of-work/ homemaker 3k-6k 
Wuma F 70s homemaker 
Ms. Qiu F 20s employed 1k 
Mr. He M 30s employed 16k-33k 
Mr. Lin M 60s self-employed n/a 
Mr. Liu M 20s student 3k 
Mr. Zhan M 30s employed 3k 
Guang M 20s employed 1k 
Rou-Zhu F 30s employed 3k 
Yi-Zhi F 30s employed n/a 
Ms. Huang F 60s out-of-work 66k-100k 
Ting-Xuan F 20s student 
(mutual fund investor) 
10k 
Mr. Yan M 30s employed 100k-366k 
Sheng-Ji M 60s retired/ brokerage office 
stayer 
n/a 
Yi-Hong M 20s student 10k 
Mrs. Kuo F 60s homemaker/ brokerage 
office stayer 
233k 
Ms. Wu F 20s student 3k 
Mr. Zhang M 30s employed 23k-26k 
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Table ii: Relational work in investing, example strategies 
Transaction Relational strategy Economic relation reproduced Nature of social tie (Chan, 2009) 
Setting up and funding brokerage 
accounts for children (e.g. Mr Liu, 
Yi-Hong, Zhi-Chun) 
Earmarking money at risk for 
educational purposes 
Hierarchical relation between parents 
and children maintained; 
cultural/educational capital 
consolidated in children 
Kinship – asymmetric obligation 
‘Gifting’ trading capital to siblings 
(e.g. Ou-Yang, Mr Zhang) 
Blurring strategy between gift 
and loan 
Hierarchical relation between parents 
and children maintained; obligations of 
gift or loan exchange negotiated 
Kinship – asymmetric obligation 
Trading as entry to status group; 
sharing stock tips within status 
group (e.g. Mr Yan) 
Access to network controlled 
through gatekeepers 
Hierarchical status relations between 
student peers maintained; further 
dependencies introduced (e.g. Mr Yan’s 
struggle with losses) 
Acquired – asymmetric obligation 
Advance warning of stock collapse; 
sharing inside information (My Yan, 
Mrs Kuo) 
Limited information flow 
through network gatekeeper 
Hierarchical relations between 
information source and recipient 
maintained; further dependencies 
introduced 
Acquired – asymmetric obligation 
Persuading others to start investing 
(Mr Kuo, Mrs Zheng) 
Performance of expertise and 
success 
Hierarchical relations between 
persuader and persuaded maintained; 
further dependencies introduced, e.g. 
for information, debt 
Kinship or acquired – asymmetric 
obligation 
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